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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1093 
___________ 
 
PETER SAUERS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LOWER SOUTHAMPTON TOWNSHIP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-02325) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 26, 2017 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 9, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Peter Sauers, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his Amended Complaint against 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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Lower Southampton Township.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 Sauers’ Amended Complaint is difficult to understand and does not contain clear 
factual allegations.  He appears to challenge a zoning ordinance and avers that he “will 
suffer a severe diminution in value and quiet enjoyment of [his] home should the subject 
rezoning/spot zoning result in the proposed subject development with the use of [his] 
small residential street.”  Am. Compl. at 20-21.  He also alleges that a public hearing was 
not held in connection with the property at issue.  Sauers asserts violations of rights to 
due process and equal protection and claims under state law.   
 The Township moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  
After a hearing, the District Court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction, but held 
that Sauers had failed to state a claim for relief.  This appeal followed.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 822 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2016).  To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Sauers argues on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing his due process 
claims.  The District Court ruled that Sauers did not state a cognizable procedural due 
process claim because, among other things, public records provided by the Township 
established that it gave notice of its proposed zoning ordinance in a local newspaper and 
held public hearings.  Sauers asserts that the District Court erred in addressing whether 
the Township gave notice of the zoning ordinance because he had claimed that his rights 
were violated by the Township’s later decision to grant zoning variances to property 
owners without public notice.   
 As the Township asserts, Sauers’ Amended Complaint does not mention zoning 
variances.  It is at best unclear whether the Amended Complaint challenges an action by 
the Township regarding the zoning of the property or its use.  Sauers relies on a 
discussion at the hearing on the motion to dismiss where the Township’s counsel 
explained several decisions that had been made related to the property at issue.  The 
hearing transcript, however, also reflects that Sauers took issue with the property’s 
zoning classification.  To the extent Sauers sought to challenge the issuance of a variance, 
his Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim, he had 
already been given an opportunity to amend his complaint, and his District Court filings 
reflect that allowing further amendment would have been futile.  See Phillips v. County 
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of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (affording leave to amend is not required 
where amendment would be futile).1   
 Sauers also challenges the District Court’s decision that he did not state an equal 
protection claim because he did not allege any facts that could support a finding that the  
Township “‘irrationally distinguished between similarly situated classes.’”  See County 
Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) 
(stating inquiry applicable to equal protection challenge to zoning ordinance).  Sauers 
states that he alleged that the Township treated similarly-situated properties differently 
when it granted a variance to build a driveway on the property at issue and no such 
permission was granted to any other property on the street.  Contrary to Sauers’ 
argument, he did not allege these facts in his Amended Complaint.  He has not shown 
that the District Court erred in dismissing this claim.  See id.2  
 Sauers also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his civil rights claim.  
He appears to refer to the dismissal of Count IV of his Amended Complaint.  The District 
Court liberally construed this claim as a First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, but found that he failed to state a claim for relief.  Sauers does not 
                                              
1To the extent Sauers seeks to appeal the District Court’s ruling that he failed to state a 
substantive due process claim, Sauers does not present any argument on this ruling and 
we do not consider it.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
2The District Court ruled that, because Sauers’ federal due process and equal protection 
claims fail, his same claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution fail.  Sauers agrees that 
his protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution in this regard are coextensive with 
those under the United States Constitution.  
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contend that he states a retaliation claim but argues that his § 1983 action should not be 
dismissed because he has alleged that his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments have been abridged.  Sauers has not shown that the District Court erred in 
dismissing Count IV.  His Fourteenth Amendment claims were brought in other counts 
and, as discussed below, the District Court considered his Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause claim separately.    
 Finally, Sauers argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his Takings 
Clause claim.  The District Court ruled that, to the extent Sauers was attempting to bring 
such a claim, he had not pled facts in support.  The District Court noted that Sauers had 
not alleged that the Township took any action with regard to his property and that, even if 
he could make out a plausible claim, he had not shown that he had exhausted state law 
procedures for seeking compensation.  Sauers contends on appeal that the Township’s 
rezoning of neighboring property and authorization of development lowered the value of 
his property and constitutes a “taking,” and that his property’s value was lowered without 
the payment of just compensation.  Sauers has not shown that his Amended Complaint, 
which makes only a passing reference to a takings claim and contains few factual 
allegations, states a claim for relief.  As noted above, Sauers’ District Court filings reflect 
that allowing further amendment would have been futile.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
